Electric Vehicle Vulnerabilities - Risks and Solutions

Author: Rakesh Kumar, Ph.D.

Published: 2023-11-29 | Last Updated: 2023-11-29

Contents

Overview: This article explores the potential risks associated with cyber attacks on electric vehicles and provides solutions for protecting both in-vehicle and external network vulnerabilities.

One of the key technologies that has helped society achieve its high decarbonization and sustainable energy targets over the last decade has been electric vehicles (EVs).

What are the elements that make electric vehicles susceptible to security breaches?

This article examines electric vehicle vulnerabilities resulting from:

In-Vehicular Vulnerabilities

Controller Area Network Bus

Controller Area Network (CAN) is a peer-to-peer system that works on an isolated trust model. If an attacker gets into the CAN bus or even just one electronic control unit, they can completely control how the electric vehicle works because the CAN bus security architecture is not protected against malware being put into it.

To pursue a desired harmful goal, an attacker with full control could alter, eavesdrop, reverse engineer, spoof, or replay the CAN communications.

Every peer that is connected to the CAN bus, such as an electronic control unit or peripheral device, receives messages sent by these devices.

Furthermore, in order to minimize memory costs and ensure a prompt transfer of the information, the CAN bus message is neither authenticated nor encrypted. This is critical for time-sensitive electronic control units like the brake control unit.

Sending and receiving peer IDs are not included in a message that is sent over the CAN system. Instead, it is sent according to its arbitration ID, which indicates the priority of the message. Due to its low bandwidth, the CAN bus cannot support complex and computationally demanding encryption.

On-Board Diagnostic Port

From this angle, the attacker's main task is to damage the CAN bus. The (on-board diagnostic port) OBD2 port of the CAN bus has been the focus of extensive investigation and has been designated as a critical access point to the CAN bus due to its sizable infiltration surface made possible by both physical and remote vulnerabilities.

Many times during an electric vehicle's lifetime, third parties like a mechanic during vehicle maintenance, a valet while parking, and a charging station helper can physically access the OBD2 port.

Furthermore, smartphone applications such as the Open Vehicle Monitoring System (OVMS) that are connected to a cellular network or a wireless short-range network can compromise the OBD2 port. Thus, the apps enable remote monitoring and management of the electric vehicle's parts and functions.

There have been reports of similar vulnerabilities in FlexRay, LIN, and MOST. If the LIN and MOST were broken into, they would not allow the key attacks listed above. This is because they are not as vulnerable as the CAN and FlexRay. This is so because the LIN is less exposed to external EV networks and the MOST network is limited to non-critical ECUs like the in-vehicular infotainment system.

Tire Pressure Monitoring System

Another in-vehicular attack vector is the Tire Pressure Monitoring System (TPMS). The technology is susceptible to hacks, which might compromise electric vehicle security and privacy. The tire pressure sensors transmit unencrypted signals; their identification is static 32-bit strings, and their messages lack authentication.

Attackers can overhear, reverse engineer, and spoof communications with an electric vehicle within 40 meters because of these security weaknesses. False data injections into the electric vehicle in-vehicular infotainment system and remote tracking of the electric vehicle are the outcomes of the attack.

External Network Vulnerabilities

Physically Accessible Ports

In addition to the OBD2 connector, there are other physical interfaces that are connected and can be utilized to control the electronic control units and external cyber layer. It includes things like USB ports, SD card ports, CD/DVD drives, headphone connectors, touchscreens, and optical media readers.

For the in-vehicular infotainment system's software updates, smartphone charging, media playback, and human interface, these ports are frequently physically accessed. When malicious devices are placed into these ports, an attacker can use them to introduce persistent malware into the in-vehicular infotainment system, start a denial-of-service attack, and even act as a side-channel access point to interfere with the operation of other electronic control units.

An electric vehicle may come into contact with such a malicious device at several stages of its maintenance and supply chain.

Internet Service Portals

The in-vehicular infotainment system has wireless interfaces (like Bluetooth) for interacting with cellphones in addition to USB connections. Despite being short-range, this pairing is susceptible to cyberattacks.

This flaw gives an attacker the ability to infect the in-vehicular infotainment system with malware, prevent its service from working, and take control of smartphones and in-vehicular infotainment data.

Malicious smartphone apps that are mirrored in the in-vehicular infotainment dashboard also present data integrity risks to the in-vehicular infotainment system and side-channel threats to the CAN bus.

When electric vehicle drivers use different third-party smartphone applications for electric vehicle charging station locating and remote electric vehicle monitoring and control, these vulnerabilities probably present security problems. Moreover, third-party programs that have been installed on the in-vehicular infotainment system may be dangerous or vulnerable to attack.

Electric Vehicle Charging Station

An electric vehicle typically connects to an electric vehicle charging station using a CAN bus or the Power Line Communication's wired communication layer. This communication protocol, ISO 15118, is susceptible to cyberattacks.

ISO 15118 governs the connection between an electric vehicle and an electric vehicle charging station but does not include any security measures like message certification or end-to-end encryption. It could allow a remote attacker to intercept, alter, and fake the electric vehicle charging message.

Radio Stations

Long travel distances cause the GPS signals to be relatively faint; as a result, the GPS receiver prefers the attacker-generated stronger signals. Similarly, signals sent to an electric vehicle radio by FM radio stations are susceptible to malware injection and remote spoofing attacks.

Road-Side Infrastructure and Vehicles

Intelligent and autonomous transportation advancements necessitate the wireless communication of vehicles. The vehicles and roadside units (RSUs) in this futuristic communication architecture, known as the vehicular ad-hoc network (VANET), are connected through LANs or cellular networks.

For improved safety, comfort, and efficiency when driving and routing, vehicles communicate with roadside units and other vehicles regarding information on road conditions, traffic, accidents, and vehicle position and speed. Nevertheless, these interfaces make the vehicles' data integrity and privacy more vulnerable to attacks from other networks and devices.

By imitating the presence of several virtual vehicles in the network, an attacker may, for instance, conduct a Sybil-type attack on VANET. These fake vehicles have the ability to disrupt the network or propagate false information to roadside units and other linked cars.

Original Equipment Manufacturers/Vendors

The original equipment manufacturer and outside suppliers must access electronic control units to provide security patches and software updates. Traditionally, the OBD2 and USB connections have been used to connect actual dongles and USB flash drives for this purpose.

Updates are provided as code or data pictures together with metadata that includes authentication information. As a result, man-in-the-middle cyberattacks, in which an attacker can remotely spy, reject, and modify the update, are possible with wireless software upgrades. An illustration of the multi-level, cyber-physical nexus of electric vehicles, electric vehicle charging stations, and the power grid is shown in Fig. 1.

schematic-diagram

Fig. 1 A schematic diagram of the multi-level, cyber-physical nexus of EVs, EVCSs, and the power grid Source: IEEE Access

Summarizing the Key Points

The article discusses vulnerabilities in the Controller Area Network bus, Tire Pressure Monitoring System, and other physically accessible ports.

Reference

Acharya, Samrat, Yury Dvorkin, Hrvoje Pandzic, and Ramesh Karri. “Cybersecurity of Smart Electric Vehicle Charging: A Power Grid Perspective.” IEEE Access 8 (2020): 214434–53. https://doi.org/10.1109/access.2020.3041074.

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Rakesh Kumar, Ph.D.

Rakesh Kumar holds a Ph.D. in electrical engineering, specializing in power electronics. He is a Senior Member of the IEEE Power Electronics Society, Class of 2021. He writes high-quality, long-form technical articles for global B2B semiconductor brands. Feel free to reach out to him at rakesh.a@ieee.org! Checkout his complete portfolio @muckrack.com/rakesh-kumar-phd | @linkedin.com/in/rakesh-kumar-phd

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Electric Vehicle Vulnerabilities - Risks and Solutions